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Abstract 
In spite of extensive research dedicated to the rise and development of fringe populist political 
parties in Eastern Europe, little attention has been paid to the organizational determinants of their 
electoral performance. This article aims to fill this void in the literature and analyzes the extent to 
which particular types of leadership and party organization could influence the electoral 
performance of three political parties from Bulgaria, Republic of Moldova and Romania. The 
qualitative analysis is conducted for the period 2012-2015 and uses a combination of primary (party 
statutes) and secondary sources (party histories, electoral databases, and literature). The results 
indicate how the existence of underdeveloped party organizations has a negative influence on the 
electoral performance, while strong and charismatic leaders are an insufficient condition for 
ensuring survival on the political arena. 
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Introduction 
The emergence and development of fringe populist parties have been analyzed from several 
perspectives. At the macro-level, the literature has focused on populism as a response to the wider 
process of democratization. Populist actors, here, are the result of the challenges presented by the 
transition to democracy either as vehicles of social, economic and cultural nostalgia for the past or 
as hybrid forms of neo-conservatisms and neo-liberalism. At the meso-level, the personalization of 
politics has been directly connected with a post-enlargement wave of populism linked to political 
leaders and the promotion of political discourses that tended to sidestep traditional ideological 
lines. In parallel, anti-establishment discourse, severe criticism of the incumbent elite and an 
emphasis on tough measures against corruption all increased the appeal of political outsiders and 
led to their relocation from the fringes of politics (see the introduction to this special issue). At the 
micro-level, research describes how voters are mobilized as a result of the match between their 
anti-system attitudes and the discourses of populist actors.  
Although informative and very useful, these approaches rarely look beyond the party leaders 
(and their rhetoric) when referring to the electoral appeal of the fringe populist parties. The leaders 
continue to lie at the core of contemporary political parties (Cross & Pilet 2016), but another crucial 
component – party organization – has been largely ignored. Previous studies have looked at the 
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features of populist leaders with emphasis on their ability to genuinely represent the demos/ethnos, 
to provide simple (i.e. with immediate effects) policy solutions and to mobilize voters (van der Brug 
& Mughan 2007; Bos et al. 2013; Kriesi 2014). Little attention has been paid to the potential effect 
of party organization on the electoral performance of populist parties. This paper aims to fill this 
void in the literature and analyzes the extent to which particular types of leadership and party 
organization could influence the electoral performance of three populist political parties from 
Bulgaria (Bulgaria without Censorship, BBT), the Republic of Moldova (Party of Socialists from the 
Republic of Moldova, PSRM) and Romania (People’s Party Dan Diaconescu, PPDD). These three 
political parties were selected because they belong to the same type of party, i.e. they emerged at 
the fringes with an anti-elite and anti-corruption (a common problem in the three countries) 
rhetoric, but differ greatly with respect to their electoral performance.    
The qualitative analysis is conducted for the period 2012-2015 and uses a combination of 
primary (party statutes) and secondary sources (party histories, electoral databases, and literature). 
We look at two variables – party leader and organization – and our central argument is that strong 
leadership allows these parties to gain visibility and achieve good electoral results, but solid party 
organization helps parties maintain a certain level of popularity and may enhance their continuity 
in the parliamentary arena. The comparison between these three parties reveals important nuances 
in the leadership and organization of populist parties and provides useful insights about the 
mechanisms through which electoral performance has been achieved. The results indicate how the 
existence of light and underdeveloped party organizations has a negative influence on electoral 
performance. Strong and charismatic leaders are insufficient to ensure continuity in the 
parliamentary or even the political arena. This study is relevant for at least two reasons. First, it 
reveals the importance of two distinct determinants (leaders and organization) that are often taken 
together in the literature. Second, it shows that populist parties can influence their electoral survival 
by setting up a strong and stable organization. The personalization and centralization of power in 
the form of a one-man show is not a good recipe for sustainable electoral performance.  
The following section reviews the existing literature and provides a working definition of 
populism. It also includes a theoretical discussion about the role of party leader and organization in 
mobilizing voters. The third section presents the features of the three populist parties analyzed in 
the paper. Following this, we assess the two dimensions of analysis for each of the parties. The 
conclusions summarize the main findings and discuss the major implications of this research for the 
study of populism.  
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Populist Parties and their Ties with the Electorate 
When dealing with populism, the first challenge is its definition, since “the term has been used to 
describe political movements, parties, ideologies, and leaders across geographical, historical, and 
ideological contexts” (Gidron & Bonikowski 2013, p.3). The definition of a specific interpretative 
framework of populism is crucial for comparative analyses because it allows to avoid random 
decisions about what counts as a populist party. In the attempt to define populism, several 
conceptual approaches have been debated and fine-tuned, among which are populism as a style, as 
a strategy, as a discourse or as an ideology (Taggart 2000; Weyland 2001; Mudde 2004; Stanley 
2008; Moffitt & Tormey 2014). These scholars point to different features of populism in which 
various kinds of extremisms, criticisms and anti-isms in general cohabitate. Unsurprisingly, the 
literature has remained doubtful about the analytical capacity of such a versatile concept applied to 
an ideological mixture, as it is associated with both radical right parties and movements (Ignazi 2003; 
Mudde 2007) and left-wing extremisms (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2013). 
Beyond the varying empirical applications and nuances, over the last two decades, one of 
the most consolidated lines of analysis has depicted populism as a ‘thin-centered ideology that 
considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, “the 
pure people” and “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the 
volonté générale (general will) of the People” (Mudde 2004, p.543). In line with Freeden’s 
clarifications (1996), a thin-centered ideology tends to be “limited in ideational ambitions and 
scope” considering that its conceptual arrangements fail to provide its specific solutions to the major 
questions of social-justice, distribution and conflict management. Accordingly, populism pervades 
traditional ideological frontiers and blends with both left or right-wing features, the direction of the 
graft and its intensity depending upon the socio-political context within which the populist parties 
mobilize (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2013). On these grounds, references to the pure people, the corrupt 
elite and the general will are considered the necessary and sufficient conditions for classifying a 
phenomenon as populist (Kaltwasser 2014, p.479). A core of scholars (Albertazzi & McDonnell 
2008b; Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011; Kaltwasser 2014) agree that populism can be best defined as a 
“thin-centered ideology” as “it expresses a distinct and internally coherent map of the political, but 
thin in its focus on broad normative principles and ontological matters rather than the detail of the 
policy” (Stanley 2008, p.102). 
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As a result of these conceptualizations this paper considers populism as a heterogeneous 
group of ideas filtered by the antagonism between the pure and genuine people and the rapacious 
and corrupt elites, and the primacy of popular sovereignty. This definition covers both left- and 
right-wing forms of populism and separates the populist parties from the mainstream actors. Now 
that we have defined what populism is, we now turn to the ways in which it may adapt to the 
repertoires of mass mobilization in representative democracy. Given this, the following sub-section 
focuses on the interplay between the ideational frame of reference and the organization of the 
party competing under populist slogans.  
 
Two Pathways to Voter Mobilization 
Poguntke (2002) identifies two ways in which political parties communicate with their voters in 
order to mobilize them. On the one hand, party leaders play a crucial role since they initiate a direct 
communication with the electorate through the media and the Internet. Party leaders are aware of 
individual citizens’ preferences and promise responsiveness in exchange for their votes. On the 
other hand, the communication is mediated by party organizations that seek to aggregate the 
multitude of individual wishes into coherent demands that can be sent to the party elites. Parties 
can benefit greatly from organizational communication since tighter connections with the 
electorate are possible through the party structures on the ground (Gherghina 2014).  
The direct and organizational styles of communication with the electorate have some 
differences but are also complementary in ensuring mobilization. The differences lie in the 
complexity, coverage, and length of the processes. Direct communication is relatively simple and 
reaches a large audience in a short period of time, while organizational communication requires 
more resources and time but has potentially deeper and wider coverage. The complementarity is 
reflected in the use of direct communication by organizational communication. For example, it is 
not just party leaders who use TV outlets or websites, but members of the party organization do the 
same; quite often the functioning of a party website or TV station depends on the voluntary work 
of members. Direct communication is almost a constant within the party system in the sense that 
many party leaders of other parties use it. However, organizational communication differs greatly, 
relative to the different development of party organizations and this can make a difference to the 
electoral fate of parties. The following lines explain how the populist parties (may) use these two 
pathways to mobilize voters.  
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To begin with the role of the leader, populism is “particularly liable to the politics of 
personality” (Taggart 2000, p.101). Within the supply side analysis of populism, organizational 
features have been treated as an alternative (independent) criterion for defining populism (Weyland 
2001; Johansson 2014). Based on the populist thin-centered ideology that divides society between 
the people and the elites, populist leaders tend to behave like tribuni plebis, claiming a legitimate 
right to intervene in unfair acts for the people, against the “established structure of power and the 
dominant ideas and values of the society” (Canovan 1999, p.3). Considering that populists’ 
ideational frame claims that genuine democracy (in an etymological sense mainly) is at stake, 
salvation is granted by the intervention of the leader (Soare 2014). Hence, the leader’s features 
become essential: they “‘incarnate’ the people’s culture, articulate the will of the people, ‘say what 
people are thinking,’ can see through the machinations of the elites and have the vision to provide 
simple, understandable solutions to the problems portrayed by the élites as complex and 
intractable” (Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008a, p.7). In a sense, one could say that a populist leader 
preaches, constantly saying I’m (like) you! (Soare 2014). Incisive and personalistic types of leadership 
are the essential ingredients in increasing popular levels of support for populist parties.  
With respect to the role of party organization, previous research has shown how it can 
complement leaders’ communication with the electorate in providing incentives to the voters to 
stabilize their preferences (Tavits 2013; Gherghina 2014). The party organization acts as an effective 
communication channel through which the party’s messages reach and mobilize voters. The 
strength of organization has been found to be the basis of the establishment of political parties in 
Eastern Europe (Tavits 2013). Earlier studies also found evidence that strongly organized populist 
actors have been more successful (Lubbers et al. 2002; Pauwels 2014). In relation to the intimate 
connection between the electoral attractiveness of populist parties and their leaders, Betz (2002) 
and Ignazi (2003) analyzed the consequences of leader-centered organization. When building hyper-
centralized and vertical organizations, populist leaders tend to exercise a Bonapartist control over 
their parties. In these cases, leadership strength is regularly interpreted as a guarantee of internal 
solidity and as a synonym for programmatic flexibility. By fully controlling their parties, populist 
leaders can simultaneously maintain ideological cohesion and limit the damaging effect of potential 
fractionalization. Successful populist leaders are hence able to impose their will over the three faces 
of the party organization (for details, see Katz & Mair 1993); in the name of the party unity, populist 
leaders tend to neutralize deviant voices by isolating them.  
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In a detailed comparative research of 40 parties, Carter (2005, p.97) focuses on the causal 
links between organization, leadership and party electoral success. The analysis accounts for three 
organizational criteria (the degree of centralization, the strength of the leadership and the level of 
factionalism) and identifies two main categories of parties: 1) weakly organized and poorly led 
parties and 2) strongly organized and well-led parties. In reaction to the electoral results, her 
findings show that strongly organized and well-led parties tend to better perform than the poorly-
organized/led parties. From a slightly different perspective, Norris (2005) focuses on the effects of 
party organization on electoral trajectories, attributing the electoral deadlocks faced by parties such 
as the Pim Fortuyn List in the Netherlands to their fragile organizations. Hence Norris joins Carter in 
concluding that, beyond the momentum of their electoral breakthrough, populist parties rely both 
on charismatic leadership and effective organization in order to maintain or broaden their electoral 
visibility. Mudde (2007, p.270) emphasizes the paramount importance of the organization in the 
persistence of populist parties; minimal organization can be valorized during the electoral 
breakthrough, but the ability of populist parties to build more structured organizations appears to 
be a major asset for explaining their electoral survival. 
In brief, there are theoretical reasons to believe that party organization is, next to leadership, 
a potential determinant of electoral performance. The following section compares and contrasts 
how this has worked for the three parties investigated.  
 
The Populist Profile and Electoral Performance  
Post-communist populist actors base their rhetoric on the need to simultaneously re-unify the 
people and enact the genuine popular will. Voices in favor of increased participation and direct 
democracy multiplied in tandem with the widespread hostility towards intermediaries between the 
people and institutions (e.g. political parties) and the emphasis on the positive role of political 
mobilization by Messianic leaders who entered politics in an attempt to save democracy from the 
maneuvers, clientelism and corruption of elites (Pirro 2015). The three political parties investigated 
belong to this type of and share these features. The BBT, formed on the eve of the 2014 elections 
for the European Parliament (EP), has its origins in the 2013 wave of protests triggered by increased 
poverty and corruption under the form of a civic movement (Website BBT 2015). Its discourses focus 
on Bulgaria’s main problems: poverty and corruption. It promotes the fight against corruption within 
a broader protest against the establishment and the oligarchs. The BBT’s identity builds around the 
struggle against elites, who are portrayed as conspirators who misuse public money and disregard 
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the people’s basic needs. The party’s discourse uses simple and popular stories, conspiracy theories 
and non-conformist behaviors.  
 The PSRM, founded in 1997, employed a consistent rhetoric, emphasizing the need to 
defend the “losers” of the democratization process and to reinforce the allegiance to the traditional 
networks of alliance (in primis the Russian Federation). The party avoids standard radical left/anti-
capitalist positions while promoting strong mobilization against the corrupt political elites. The 
party’s message is not completely anti-establishment, given that it regularly refers to the expertise 
of the management of the 2001-2009 period of economic and social growth Moldova knew under 
the Communist government. The PSRM cherishes popular sovereignty as the only legitimate source 
of political power and criticizes a wide range of internal and external pathologies that hamper its 
fulfillment (e.g. Romanian interests, EU institutions, NATO etc.). On these grounds, the people are 
portrayed as victims of the EU technocracy and of the Western moral values that clash with 
traditional Orthodoxy. 
The PPDD was founded in 2011 and had a strong anti-establishment discourse. In its 2012 
manifesto the party favors lower taxes for the population but calls for greater state involvement 
(i.e. in terms of state owned enterprises and market regulation) and expenditure. Corruption and 
clientelism are among the favorite themes of the party (Gherghina & Miscoiu 2014). Overall, the 
PPDD displays a clear tendency to present itself as a representative of all Romanians, trying to return 
the country to its citizens. Another strategy is to cultivate a nationalist feeling by introducing a law 
that allows punishment for all those who speak against the country. Another point of the manifesto 
refers to the (re)unification with the Republic of Moldova, an older dream of Romanian nationalists. 
 
The Electoral Fortunes 
The electoral trajectories of the three parties contrast sharply. The BBT made its debut on the 
political scene in the 2014 EP elections as part of a short-lived electoral alliance with the radical 
nationalist IMRO-Bulgarian National Movement, the Agrarian People's Union and Gergiovden 
Movement. The alliance obtained 10.66% of the votes and two seats, one for the BBT leader. In view 
of the early elections for the national parliament scheduled for October 2014, the BBT signed a 
partnership agreement with Lider (since March 2015 - Bulgarian Democratic Centre). The new 
coalition gained 15 seats in the Bulgarian Assembly and ended up sixth – it came in fourth place in 
the EP elections (Table 1). The party leader Nikolay Barekov was on the party’s list for both elections 
as a strategy to attract voters, and he eventually decided to take up his MEP mandate. Between the 
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2014 legislative elections and March 2015, the BBT lost almost all its Members of Parliament (MPs) 
and its parliamentary group disintegrated. The party was renamed Movement Recharge Bulgaria; 
after obstacles raised by the Central Election Commission, it decided not to run in the 2017 snap 
elections. 
The PSRM took part in the national parliamentary elections between 1998 and 2005 on a 
regular basis, running alone only in the 1998 elections. In spite of changing coalitions, the party 
failed to obtain good electoral results and did not gain any parliamentary seats (Table 1). In the 2009 
elections it did not compete and in the 2010 elections it was included on the electoral lists of the 
Communist Party. Only in the 2014 parliamentary elections did the party obtain parliamentary 
representation when it finished first.1 
 
Table 1: The Electoral Performance of the Investigated Populist Parties 
Party Year of formation Elections % of votes No. of seats Rank Coalition 
BBT 2014 EP 2014 10.66 1 / 17 4 Yes 
  National 2014 5.69 15 / 240 6 Yes 
  National 1998 0.59 0 / 101 12 No 
PSRM 1997 National 2001 0.46 0 / 101 15 Yes 
  National 2005 4.97 0 / 101 4 Yes 
  National 2014 20.51 25 / 101 1 No 
PPDD 2011 National 2012 13.99 47 / 412 3 No 
  EP 2014 3.67 0 / 32 7 No 
Note: Election results for the PPDD are reported for the lower Chamber of Parliament. 
 
Having emerged in a party system that is quite unfriendly to new competitors, the PPDD had a very 
good electoral performance in the 2012 legislative elections, in which it placed third with almost 
14% of the votes (Table 1). Following that success, many MPs left the party and joined other groups, 
leading to a weakening of the party. In 2013, the party leader’s (Dan Diaconescu) TV station was 
closed down by a decision of the National Audiovisual Council of Romania, depriving the PPDD of its 
main propaganda tool. As a result of these two processes, the party’s electoral performance in the 
2014 EP elections was very poor (less than 4% of the votes and no MEP) and in 2015 the party 
disappeared, being absorbed by the National Union for the Progress of Romania. Let us now turn to 
the first analytical dimension of this paper. The following section discusses the importance of the 
leader for each populist party with emphasis on his origin, strategies, power and practices within 
the party.  
                                                          
1 A partial explanation for the PSRM’s success is connected with the Election Commission’s decision to ban the Patria 
Party from the polls because it had been accused of receiving financial support from abroad (Radio Free Europe 2014); 
this highly contested decision is likely to have led some of the Patria’s Party supporters to vote for the PSRM on the 
basis of their shared opposition to the EU integration. 
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Party Leaders as Driving Forces 
The BBT and the PPDD can be considered classic cases where the parties are the product of their 
leaders rather than the other way around. To begin with the BBT, the party founder emerged from 
outside the political establishment, which allowed Barekov to position himself as an external critic 
of the system. Barekov’s political involvement came after a long career dating back in the 1990s as 
a radio and a TV presenter; he had become executive director of the TV7 television channel. On the 
eve of the May 2013 elections, Barekov produced the story about prosecutors seizing over 300,000 
extra ballots from a printer owned by a member from the former government party Citizens for 
European Development of Bulgaria (GERB). Although initially known for his endorsement of the 
GERB leader and former Prime Minister, Boyko Borisov, Barekov became highly critical of the 
overlapping relations between politics, business, and organized crime in Bulgaria. On the eve of the 
2013 elections, despite protestations that the ballots were set aside for production defects 
(Freedom House 2014), Barekov openly accused GERB establishment of masterminding an attempt 
to commit electoral fraud.  
Well before the official launch of his party, Barekov publicized his political views and goals. 
He promoted simple and comprehensive solutions designed to drag Bulgaria out of the economic 
crisis. His discourses were less focused on how to tackle social and economic issues technically and 
focused instead on immediate (economic) “salvation” and “redemption”. As an anti-establishment 
challenge against discredited parties and elites, in November 2013 Barekov threatened to stage a 
human body blockade of the presidential office in Sofia in order to prevent former Prime Minister 
Borisov and former Interior Minister Tsvetanov from entering the building of the Presidential 
Administration; on the same occasion, he declared he would boo the leading representatives of the 
Socialists and liberals in order to let them "hear the truth about themselves" (Novinite 2013). This 
non-conventional method of voicing discontent together with an anti-establishment rhetoric 
allowed Barekov to present himself as opposing the entire political spectrum, with no regard to 
differences between governing élites and opposition. His strategy of communication was based on 
voicing the will of the common people, on voicing people’s thoughts with common words and in 
providing simple solutions. The content of his discourse was voluntarily and pragmatically 
downgraded in favor of visibility and direct appeal. Part of his credibility was a by-effect of his 
previous career, which allowed him to claim that he saw through the machinations of the elites. The 
emphasis on the genuine Bulgarian people as opposed to the alienated elite gave him ample space 
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for an anti-establishment discourse although he regularly paid attention not to appear too politically 
extreme. 
At the first congress of the party, in 2014, Barekov was elected by 5,000 delegates as 
president of the BBT. As the party statute shows, the leader has a major role in coordinating the 
party’s activities and positions. His role is particularly important in controlling the allegiances of the 
appointed vice-presidents and members of the executive committee. His hegemonic position in the 
party is illustrated by the fact that those within the party who disagreed with him were labeled as 
traitors. This was visible in the case of the BBT vice-president Angel Slavchev (2014) and after the 
defection of almost all the party’s MPs (2015). For example, faced with Slavchev’s allegation of being 
"a mere puppet... directed every day by the Movement for Rights and Freedoms’ MP Delyan 
Deevski", Barekov counterattacked, portraying Slavchev’s position as "manipulative". Slavchev was 
accused of “trying to build parallel party structures” and of “deciding to leave the party after failing 
to gather support for his actions” (Novinite 2014b). In formal terms, Slavchev’s dismissal was 
justified by both acts undermining the prestige and reputation of the party (art. 38 of the Party 
Statute) and injurious behavior that damaged the reputation and interests of the party (Art. 11 of 
the Party Statute). In practice, Barekov made extensive use of the statutory powers and increased 
his level of domination within the party central office.  
 
Table 2: A Comparative Overview of the Party Leaders’ Features 
Features Nikolay Barekov (BBT) Igor Dodon (PSRM) Dan Diaconescu (PPDD) 
Origin Outside politics 
Radio and TV presenter 
Experienced politician 
High expertise 
Outside politics 
Journalist  
Strategy Voicing the will of 
ordinary people 
Simple solutions 
Key problems from a 
socalist perspective 
Chameleonic strategy 
Representing ordinary 
people 
Simple solutions 
Power Hegemonic position 
Centralized decision-
making 
External power 
Intra-party medium 
centralization 
Hegemonic position 
Centralized decision-
making 
Practices Personal party 
Removing opponents 
Main image of the party 
Investing in organization 
Personal party 
Appointing loyal people 
 
The PPDD leader, Dan Diaconescu, largely matches this profile. Diaconescu established a personal 
party that combined improvisation and opportunism. He played the central role in a) establishing 
the party structures and mobilizing electoral support and b) conveying the programmatic discourse. 
The party organization was built by transforming parts of his audience into followers and party 
members (Chiruta and Rachitam, 2012). This was a pragmatic approach since the legal provisions 
required a party to have 25,000 members to formally register. However, this audience-centered 
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structure was sufficient only for the initial phase of party formation. When faced with the task of 
fielding candidates for the national legislative elections, Diaconescu started to import politicians 
from other parties who had limited opportunities for re-nomination; they in turn brought financial 
and symbolic benefits to the PPDD. With respect to the programmatic discourse, Diaconescu 
followed the crude and simplistic style of his TV shows. This was a mixture of anti-corruption slogans 
and nationalistic values that coexisted with people-friendly economic measures. The ideas that 
nurtured the programmatic identity were derived from the leader’s own experiences with what he 
called, in general, the abuses of the system and in particular of the judicial system. His experiences 
were transformed into powerful symbols of the fight against the system, the elites, and the 
establishment.  
In conveying these messages, the role of his visual media outlet played an essential role. The 
party was advertised even before its official formation. The fines imposed by state authorities for 
illegally conducting its electoral campaign were interpreted as proof that by a corrupted and 
inefficient system was inventing obstacles to obstruct the honest people and their future 
representatives. According to this view, the leader, the party and the audience were victims that 
were able to gather their discontent in a common voice. Diaconescu became not only the main face 
of the party and the source of its identity, but also its tutor. The party could not exist without the 
leader’s material and symbolic involvement. The emphasis on the ‘Savior’ character of the leader 
reinforced his legitimacy as being “beyond the party”, a status granted directly by the people. While 
the spontaneous and dilettante characteristics of the party were publically defended as proof of the 
“non-contamination” from the establishment, on the eve of the 2012 elections the extent of the 
leader’s full control over the internal decision-making process was illustrated by the pragmatic 
compromises over candidate selection and campaign funding.  
All this indicates Diaconescu’s hegemonic behavior in an over-personalized party that relied 
on his TV station and personal network. The entire electoral campaign was meant to fit the visual 
formats of the TV station-centered campaign and the content of leader’s speeches for more than a 
decade. The PPDD was deprived ex ante of its capacity to provide a counterpoint to the personal 
interpretation provided by the leader; it could not challenge his complete control over the three 
faces of the party (party in public office, in central office and on the ground). Consequently, the 
party was created at the service of the leader: the personal and business dimensions overlapped, 
and the party became fully dependent on the leader's inputs. These practices were formally backed 
by provisions that ensured the control of the leader over a great deal of party activity, with a very 
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high level of centralization. For example, the president decided the party manifesto and political 
strategy (Art. 60, PPDD Statute), approved all candidates for public office (including a veto right), 
validated all internal elections, applied sanctions, and led all the meetings of the party in its central 
office (Art. 69, PPDD Statute).  
 
A Different Profile 
The failure to gain parliamentary seats placed the PSRM in a marginal position for more than a 
decade after its foundation. Its spectacular success in 2014 was also the result of new leadership. 
Igor Dodon had held various positions within the public administration and had high-level political 
experience. As a member of the Communist Party, he had occupied ministerial positions, first as a 
Vice-Minister of Trade and Economics (2005), then as Minister of Trade and Economics (2006-2009) 
and Deputy Prime Minister (2008-2009). A couple of months before his defection from the 
Communists’ ranks, he had been narrowly defeated in the election to be mayor of the capital city. 
He resigned from the Communist Party due to the constitutional crisis following the resignation of 
President Voronin in 2009.2 He joined the PSRM and was unanimously elected as president by the 
700 delegates at the 10th Congress of the party organized one month later in December 2011 (e-
democracy.md 2011). He stepped down in 2016 only after being elected as the country’s president. 
Unlike the BBT and PPDD leaders, Dodon had a political background and promoted a peculiar anti-
establishment discourse oriented against corruption, criminality and the foreign elites that endorse 
homosexuality. He praised instead the glorious years of the 2001-2005 communist management. 
Dodon’s legitimacy was justified both in relation to the credibility of his political and technical 
expertise, and to the proximity to the people and the shared vision of society (e.g. moral values, 
how politics should function). 
From the very beginning, Dodon’s strategy was a mixture of messages focused on people 
and chameleonic adaptation. In line with the communist perspective, he engaged in a discourse of 
higher wages and employment rates, amendments of the education system and higher social 
allowances. He also dedicated particular attention to the Transnistrian conflict and the need to 
restore peaceful relations with ethnic minorities in Moldova. He also advocated the need for a 
technocratic government with the aim of limiting the political negative influence on the 
government's work. Three years later the PSRM’s position radically changed, in line with the 
                                                          
2 Dodon has been followed by other communist MPs that temporarily formed a parliamentary group: Igor Dodon, Vadim 
Mişin, Zinaida Greceanîi, Ion Ceban, Veronica Abramciuc, Tatiana Botnariuc and Oleg Babenco. 
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leadership’s chameleonic abilities. The malleable party platform appears to be a direct continuation 
of the leader’s ability to renew himself and adapt to the people’s requirements. Hence, within a 
couple of years, the key characteristic of Dodon’s leadership can be connected with the strategic 
capacity to deter from previous engagement (e.g. technical government) and attract wider groups 
of voters (e.g. the Russophile traditional Communist electorate). 
The centralized management of the party became a model for the Moldovan state. Dodon 
has often emphasized the issues of stateness and responsibility, with emphasis on Orthodoxy, law 
and order. He often speaks about neutrality, territorial integrity and interethnic cooperation in 
Moldova. This interpretation follows the traditional inter-ethnic model of governance endorsed 
since the Soviet rule. In this sense, the party’s new leadership understood the need to distance itself 
from the concept of a dominant ethnicity (Romanian speaking community), invest in interethnic 
tolerance and the preservation of a Moldovan identity distinct from the Romanian one. Dodon’s 
“winning formula” is a combination of provocative style and increasing media coverage. He poses 
as a young and promising option for the leftist pro-Russian electorate, enjoying the explicit 
endorsement of Moscow and the Russian state media. His features as the public face of the party 
are complemented by active involvement in the internal life of the PSRM. Since 2011, Dodon 
increased party membership and increased the number of Congress delegates from 700 to 2,000. 
Unlike the leaders of the two parties discussed before, he showed concern for party development 
beyond elections. At the same time, he avoided the over-centralization of power, an element that 
could be due to the fact that the party existed before his election as president. The party statute 
has formal provisions according to which the leader is the main figure of the party in its relationship 
with voters and competition with other parties (Art. 4.26, PSRM Statute). At the same time, he leads 
the activity of the national executive in its role in deciding upon candidates; however, this role does 
not belong only to the leader as was the case with the BBT and the PPDD, and the leader is unable 
to impose sanctions or control other party activities on his own. Thus, Dodon’s power is quite limited 
with respect to intra-party decision-making, where an important role is played by the territorial 
organizations, e.g. in nominating candidates.  
The analysis in this section revealed the high importance of the party leader for each of the 
three populist parties, especially in conveying messages and mobilizing voters around elections. 
Relevant differences can be seen between the BBT and the PPDD, on the one hand, which appear 
to be structural extensions of their leaders, and the PSRM, on the other hand, which added a 
reformist and charismatic leader to an existing structure. The following section looks at this 
13 
structure and seeks to assess the development of the party organizations with a focus on the 
formation of the organization, the size of its membership, its territorial coverage and its ability to 
produce propaganda.  
 
Developing Party Organizations? 
The BBT and the PPDD were formed shortly before elections and thus their immediate concern was 
the creation of a party organization. Their approach was fairly similar and used top-down 
mechanisms for which the personal connections of the leaders were vital. The BBT started building 
its organization by attracting several defecting MPs from the ranks of mainstream parties such as 
the Bulgarian Socialist Party, GERB and Ataka. In this sense, even before the 2014 national legislative 
elections, the BBT controlled three deputies in parliament. This approach helped the party to 
develop swiftly and quickly reach a good territorial coverage. According to data provided by the BBT 
website, the party had 27 regional offices plus one in the capital city. Thus, it covered all the major 
territorial administrative divisions of the country, seeking to ensure support throughout the entire 
country. At a sub-regional level there were local organizations (named clubs) that gathered together 
one or more communal or municipal organizations. No reliable data could be found about the 
number of these organizations but some media reports referred to the establishment of such 
organizations consisting of a few tens of members. No data could be found about membership.3 
Isolated reports in the media provide some numbers that indicate extremely low membership for 
the party: 50 in the city of Stara Zagora, 150 in the city of Kazanlak and 1,500 in the Varna county. 
There is no centralized evidence of party members and the party did not answer any of our inquiries 
regarding the size of its membership. 
From a functional perspective, the party has a hierarchical structure with the National 
Congress at the top. The Congress is composed of elected delegates; according to its statutory rules, 
the Congress is in charge of deciding on programmatic documents, the election and dismissal of the 
party’s President, the selection of the members of the National Council of Regions and decisions 
regarding potential mergers. The executive committee is the operational branch in charge of 
decisions on current political issues, organizing party activities and the procedures for nominating 
candidates in elections. The Party President chairs and convenes the meetings of the National 
                                                          
3 According to the party law, in order to be registered parties are required to present a list of no less than 500 members. 
Barekov was elected by 5,000 delegates at the first Congress of the party and it is quite likely that they were also 
members. When registering the coalition with Lider for the October 2014 elections a list of 7,777 signatures was 
presented. According to the electoral law, in order to take part in the elections, parties had to provide a list of 7,000 
supporting signatures. 
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Council and the Executive Committee. He coordinates the implementation of the decisions of the 
governing bodies of the party and has a major role in formulating the party’s official positions on 
issues arising between the party’s statutory meetings. Additional statutory powers concern the 
Party President’s role in the appointment of the Vice-Presidents and the members of the executive 
committee.  
It is difficult to collect information about the BBT’s party organization due to their inactive 
website. The only place where some basic information regarding events can be found is a Facebook 
group. The reason for including the channels for propaganda in the criteria for analysis is that they 
reflect the attention paid to the continuous development of the organization and they provide 
important means with which to communicate with voters (Werkmann & Gherghina 2018). The BBT 
does not appear to place much emphasis on the role of organization. 
The PPDD mirrors the approach of the BBT to a great extent. The party developed its 
organization quite swiftly in a top-down manner. Less than half a year after its formation the PPDD 
had territorial organizations in almost all Romanian counties (i.e. territorial administrative divisions 
of the country) and in a large number of cities and towns. While the territorial organizations broadly 
covered the country, the actual number of members remains problematic. According to the PPDD’s 
official statement, membership reached 1,000,000 a few days after the January 2012 congress. This 
sharply contrasts with the figures presented in the official registry of political parties, where the 
membership organization of the PPDD is given as 31,929. The statements of the territorial branches 
support the official figures more than the numbers declared by the party. For example, two months 
before the January 2012 congress, the PPDD organization in the Gorj county – the constituency 
where Diaconescu ran against the prime-minister in the legislative elections – declared that it had 
3,000 members (PPDD website, 2013). This is illustrative since Gorj was one of the constituencies 
that supported the PPDD the most.  
The development of the PPDD’s organization was long perceived by the party leader as its 
main liability. Diaconescu has often complained about how expensive a territorial organization is 
and has emphasized that the other parties can afford to pay for professional consultancy. The official 
discourse praised dilettantism, spontaneity and improvisation as cheap solutions adopted by the 
party of the common people. Although the symmetry between the leader and the common people 
is the official element of the rhetoric, hierarchy had its relevance too. The layers and decision-
making arrangements within the PPDD largely corresponded to those presented in the BBT (Table 
3). Another similarity lies in the approach taken towards the means of party propaganda: although 
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it was once very useful for promoting the ideas of the party, the TV station was closed by state 
authorities and the website became inactive. Just before its disappearance from the political scene, 
the PPDD had an active Facebook group for a few months, which also soon became inactive. In brief, 
the disappearance of its means to communicate with voters and potential members matched the 
gradual loss of its territorial branches, e.g. through defections to other parties. 
 
Table 3: A Comparative Overview of the Party Organizations 
Features BBT PSRM PPDD 
Formation Top-down 
Hierarchical 
Partially top-down 
Stratarchical 
Top-down 
Hierarchical 
Membership Unknown 9,100 
(0.32% in the electorate) 
31,929 
(0.18% in the electorate) 
Territorial coverage Very good 
Unstable 
Very good 
Developing 
Very good 
Unstable 
Propaganda Inactive website 
Functional Facebook 
Updated Website 
Updated Facebook 
Inactive website 
Inactive TV station 
Inactive Facebook 
Note: The data on voting age population to calculate the ration of party members in the electorate  
come from IDEA. 
 
Although electorally irrelevant for more than a decade after its foundation, the PSRM maintained a 
territorially widespread organization with a number of local strongholds (in particular cities like Bălți 
and Comrat). It is relevant to note that the organization is constantly expanding: in 2011, the PSRM 
reported 8,000 members registered within 29 territorial organizations. In 2014, the same source 
spoke of more than 11,000 party members registered in 38 territorial organizations (Website PSRM). 
The number reported in Table 3 comes from the Central Electoral Commission, which asked the 
parties to declare their revenues: the PSRM claimed in April 2016 that it has 9,100 members who 
pay fees. At the same time, between the 2011 Congress until the 2014 Extraordinary Congress the 
number of delegates almost tripled (from 700 to 2,000). The recruitment of members is carefully 
managed and conditioned by (1) the knowledge of the status and party programmatic documents, 
(2) an official conversation with the secretary of the local unit of reference and (3) the completion 
of a set of documents (application form, declare about political affiliation, copy of ID card, photos). 
All these indicate a rigorous approach towards party membership that has been enhanced from 
above since at least 2011. 
According to its 2013 statute, the PSRM maintained a relatively stratarchical organization in 
which the leading bodies of the Party are the local organizations, the national committee and the 
Congress. A criterion of participation is included: their decisions are considered deliberative, if the 
meetings are attended by more than half of the total number of party members or delegates. The 
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party maintains a functional and updated website that includes documents, videos, and news about 
the party. A map with the addresses of all territorial organizations is available. Also, an updated 
Facebook page is available for members and sympathizers, which summarizes the most recent 
events and statements of the party leader.  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper analyzed the extent to which particular types of leadership and party organization 
influenced the electoral performance of three populist political parties in Bulgaria, Moldova and 
Romania. Our qualitative analysis revealed that all three political parties required a strong 
charismatic leader to pave their way to parliamentary representation. At the same time, a certain 
degree of leadership autonomy and the ability to take decisions was required in order to boost the 
electoral support of these parties, irrespective of their newly emerged character (BBT and PPDD) or 
time spent at the periphery of the political space (PSRM). In all three cases, the populist leaders 
legitimated their position through shared repertoires of criticisms against the elite and by cultivating 
the division the people vs. the corrupt and self-interested elites. As the parties were built around 
the personality of the leader, the party organization had to be built in a top-down manner (at least 
partially). Membership organizations were established or enhanced in a short period of time and 
the territorial coverage of the organization was very good in all three parties.  
In spite of these similarities, there were important differences, which had an impact on the 
electoral fate of these political parties. On the one hand, the Bulgarian and Romanian populist 
parties emphasized leadership at the expense of building a long-lasting organization. In their case 
the political management related more to personal and ad hoc strategies of the leaders than to 
coordinated organizational strategy. They were more an appendage of their leaders than 
institutions of representation per se. In their case, the leadership filtered the strategies of 
mobilization without interest in a legal rational codification of the leadership. Their top-down 
political organization, with limited membership, hierarchical structures, and high levels of 
centralization, were only meant to comply with their leaders’ efforts to attract electoral support. 
Neither the BBT nor the PPDD built organizations with the aim of developing them over time and 
making tools for representation, membership and candidate recruitment out of them. Instead, they 
served a short-term goal in assisting the leader in gaining electoral support and disintegrated soon 
thereafter. In a nutshell, their strong dependency on the party leader ensured a swift electoral 
breakthrough, but the absence of an organization impeded their survival in the long run. 
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On the other hand, the PSRM provided an alternative model in which the charismatic leader 
took responsibility for the electoral discourse alongside a developing party organization. In this 
sense, the personalization of power that characterized the other two parties was limited in this case 
and the leader did not have to (re)invent the party around him. Instead, he adapted his discourse 
and behavior to what already existed in the party; he also pushed the party’s organization to adapt 
to the new realities and worked to boost membership and to establish new organizations. Stable 
electoral support can be obtained if territorial branches provide continuous support to the party. 
The rigorous approach towards membership and the relative power provided to territorial 
organizations – as opposed to the rigid hierarchical structure that characterized the other two 
parties – increased the likelihood that this organization would develop. The result was that the 
charismatic leadership increased the visibility of the PSRM and enabled it to achieve good electoral 
results for the first time in its history, while the solid party organizations helped maintain a certain 
level of popularity. Of the three parties, it is the only one that still has a strong chance of continuing 
in the parliamentary arena.  
 The implications of this study go beyond the comparison of the three parties and have 
relevance for research on populism more broadly. At a theoretical level, these results indicate the 
existence of endogenous sources that could influence the fate of populists in the political space. 
Their inability to develop stable organizations beyond the personality of their leaders may cost them 
their continuous presence in parliament despite occasional good results at the polls. Party 
organization could thus be an important explanation for the decline of populist actors. Furthermore, 
our analysis distinguished between two analytical units that are often mixed when defining 
populism: leaders and parties. While our findings indicate that some parties heavily depend on their 
members, there are theoretical and empirical reasons to treat the two separately. At an empirical 
level, the analysis revealed the existence of several patterns of organization development between 
populist parties. This adds nuance to earlier research, which pointed in the direction of a thin 
organization in the service of the party leader. While two of the parties investigated here followed 
that pattern, the third – which was more successful electorally – provides an alternative model that 
deserves further research in either an in-depth or a comparative perspective.  
Further research could elaborate on an empirical result from this analysis that could not be 
discussed in detail: the thickness of ideology. Unlike the BBT and PPDD, the PSRM attached a thicker 
ideology to its organizational development. It could very well be that without a thick ideology the 
novelty effect of personalist leadership tends to fade over time. Ideology could therefore be an 
18 
alternative determinant for the variation in electoral performance across parties that deserves 
closer investigation. 
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